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It may be accepted that the perceptual
framework through which a social scientist
views his data is, in part, a product of his
professional training. Thus, it is not sur-
prising that political scientists have some
difficulty in viewing political decision-mak-
ing in the same light as other social choice
(Long, 1958). Yet, building on the work
of such theorists as Luce (1959) and Ar-
row (1951), some social scientists have
boldly taken that step. This is manifested
in Anthony Downs’ An Economic Theory of
Democracy (1957); Thomas Schelling’s The
Strategy of Conflict (1960); William Riker’s
Theory of Political Coalitions ( 1962 ) ; Dun-
can Black’s The Theory of Committees and
Elections (1958); and now in The Calculus
of Consent by James Buchanan and Gordon
Tullock (1962). These and other efforts to
lift political theory out of the abyss of dif-
fused speculation in which it has labored so
long are most welcome.
In The Calculus of Consent the unit of
analysis is, as with most &dquo;choice&dquo; theory,
the individual and his rational choice among
transitively ranked alternatives. Since indi-
vidual decisions, when combined, determine
collective action, the authors construct a
theory to explain the means by which con-
flict may be reconciled. In this they lean
heavily on theoretical work in welfare eco-
nomics, the analogy between political and
economic choice being maintained through-
out the book.
To support such an analogy, two proposi-
tions are rejected: (1) that the decision-
making process is a means of arriving at an
absolute truth which will attract all men
to its support; and (2) that once the
electorate becomes fully informed, individ-
ual conflicts will vanish. The &dquo;truth&dquo; which
the individual seeks in that conception is
the public interest. This contrasts with the
utility maximizer encountered in market
theory who, when confronted with alterna-
tives, will choose to maximize self-interest
in making his choices. The assumptions of
market theory and public interest theory
may both be valid if the individual shifts
psychological gears as he moves between
private and social realms. That such shift-
ing does not generally occur is basic to the
authors’ argument. Indeed, the theory put
forth is that private economic decisions and
the choice the individual makes in con-
tributing to collective (political) action are
both motivated by the individual’s utility
function.
We have in The Calculus... then, the
three essential concepts of decision theory:
A limited set of alternatives from among
which a choice must be made; an individual
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who must make a choice; and a system of
subjective preferences by which the indi-
vidual ranks alternatives, always choosing,
if rational, that which is highest in his
value scheme. With these concepts, the
authors construct a &dquo;cost minimization&dquo;
(C.M.) model in which the maximization
of individual utility is defined as the reduc-
tion of the cost of social interdependence to
zero. These costs are composed of two
elements: external costs-those the individ-
ual expects to endure as a result of the
actions of others over which he has no
control, and decision-making costs-those
resulting from the participation of the indi-
vidual in collective or organized activity.
Rational behavior of the individual is de-
fined as the maximization of individual
utility.
This model is then applied to hypotheti-
cal choice situations as reflected in such
questions as &dquo;When will a society composed
of free and rational utility-maximizing
individuals choose to undertake action col-
lectively rather than privately?&dquo; or, more
specifically, &dquo;When will an individual mem-
ber of the group find it advantageous to
enter into a ’political’ relationship with his
fellows?&dquo; In the C.M. model, he will do so
when he expects to increase his utility by
reducing his costs, but ultimate choice in
the C.M. model must depend on the rela-
tionships between external and decision-
making costs or on relative costs. These, in
turn, depend on the rules which govern
decision-making. Thus, in the final analysis,
rational behavior can be determined only
after ascertaining the effect of various
decision-making rules on relative costs.
Such consideration takes up a major portion
of the book.
As May Brodbeck has pointed out, the
term &dquo;model&dquo; has a halo effect in recent
social science literature (1959, p. 373).
Consequently, it is not amiss to keep in
mind that a theoretical framework such as
that developed by Buchanan and Tullock
must be evaluated in terms of the function
it is designed to serve. That function is to
aid in the explanation of observed phenom-
ena. However, though analysis be perfect
and conclusions logically drawn, the gap
between theory and behavior can be closed
only if the assumptions of the theory or
model are realistic.
To evaluate the realism of a model, we
must be clear as to its assumptions. Al-
though it may be argued that a theory is to
be tested by its observable consequences
only, whether resources will be invested in
such tests will be influenced by the extent
to which the theory is considered realistic.
Like those rational men who inhabit the
models of the decision theorists, the theorist
himself, in constructing a model, must
choose among the alternative assumptions
available to him. It is not clear whether the
choices made are subject to explanation by
the theory to which they contribute, but it
is clear that certain common choice situa-
tions face those involved in developing a
decision theory. Some of these alternatives
and the choices Buchanan and Tullock
make among them may be illustrated
through the following questions:
1. Is the rational behavior to which the
theory refers descriptive or formative?
A cardinal notion in utility theory is that,
when faced with alternatives, a person
chooses optimally relative to his utility func-
tion. By such a statement we may mean
that the individual should choose in a
particular way depending on the constraints
imposed by the situation. Or we may intend
a description of the way individuals actually
choose. Since the C.M. model incorporates
the former but not the latter, it follows that
the extent to which individual choices are
in fact rational, as defined by the C.M.
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model, remains an open question. More-
over, the assumption of consistency made in
The Calculus... runs contrary to empirical
data which has led Duncan Luce to suggest
that the phenomenon of inconsistency may
be basic to the choice process (1962, p. 148).
2. Is the model applicable to all situations
in which choice must be made along alter-
natives?
Here an assumption must be made about
the nature of preferences. It may be
thought that where there are alternatives
there are preferences. Yet, if a person is
asked to choose from a series of objects that
which fits a particular &dquo;real&dquo; definition,
individual preference would not seem to
enter into the calculations.l For a rose is
a rose although one might like gardenias
better. In all fairness, the B-T paradigm
does allow for the possibility of indifference
among alternatives, but as to the action to
take in such cases, other than a vote against
change, the authors’ position is unclear to
me.
3. Who is to measure utility?
In answer to this question, it is possible
to say, with the Pareto Optimalists, that
only the individual can measure his own
utility. Or with the Ordinalist school, one
might say that the utility of an alterna-
tive is the strength of a preference for it,
such preference being discoverable only
through observation of choice. Other pos-
sibilities would include measures based on
difficulty of choice as inferred from the
time and other resources devoted to it, or
on notions of expected utility. The authors
of The Calculus... assume that the de-
termination of expected utility (minimiza-
tion of net cost) is individually made, and
the measure of the cost components which
produce the minimum is a matter for indi-
vidual judgment. However, they introduce
certain limitations on individual autonomy,
possibly to avoid a wholly tautological
definition of rational behavior.
The point may be illustrated with the
authors’ analysis of representative govern-
ment, a schema in which rational behavior
is determined by the relationships of four
key variables: degree of representation,
basis of representation, rules for choosing
representatives, and decision-making rules
which prevail in the chosen body. The sub-
jective measure of utility is the individual’s
determination of that particular combina-
tion of these variables he finds most satisfy-
ing. Thus, one individual may prefer 2X,
4Y, 8Z, and 7W. Another may find 6X,
8Y, 4Z, and 2W most satisfying. The
authors, however, introduce an objective
element by developing certain cost func-
tions. Throughout The Calculus ..., de-
cision-making costs are said to rise with the
size of the majority required for decision.
Conversely, external costs are said to de-
crease as these quantities increase. In
analyzing representative government, simi-
lar statements are added for changes in the
numerical distribution of preferences in the
population (basis of representation) and for
degree of representation. Thus, once an
individual has established a maximizing
equilibrium, the authors are able to pre-
scribe the direction of rational behavior
given a change in the magnitude of any one
of the four variables. While this reviewer
is not inclined to dispute the importance of
certain numerical relationships for decision-
making, the relational assumptions the
authors make might be fruitfully examined
for their implications.
One example must suffice. In discussing
the degree of representation, it is said that
&dquo;surely the individual will recognize that
his own interests will be represented more
1 As opposed to a "nominal" definition. This
distinction is developed by Robert Bierstedt
(1959, pp. 121-44) .
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adequately and more faithfully the more
closely the representation approaches the
full membership of the group&dquo; (p. 215).
This statement contains two assertions. As-
suming the individual will recognize the re-
lationship if it exists, however, we might still
ask what conditions are necessary (though
not sufficient) for such a relationship. Al-
though a longer list of conditions might be
compiled, two may be mentioned. First,
given simple majority election, the way in
which an increase in the proportionate size
of a legislature will relate to representation
of minority interests will depend upon the
distribution of those interests in the popu-
lation. The relationship would not hold for
a small isolated minority interest until some-
thing close to unanimity is approached. It
is also assumed that the individual’s cost
function is a continuous variable. In the
B-T analysis, the relationship is represented
by a nonlinear curve reflecting the law of
diminishing marginal utility. While such
a curve may sufficiently describe the gen-
eral relationship, the possibility of discon-
tinuity in the cost function might warrant
consideration. Insofar as structural change
is to be measured by behavioral conse-
quences, the threshold of response would
seem a relevant theoretical datum.
4. What are the conditions under which
decision-making takes place?
In deciding among alternatives in such a
way as to maximize utility, the individual
must think primarily in terms of the conse-
quences which his decisional act will pro-
duce or promote. The consequences may
be certain or uncertain. In market theory,
the certainty assumption has been found
useful even though some uncertainties are
inherent in economic exchange. The same
assumption is made in the B-T model, the
application of which is to political, not
market choice. The authors recognize that
political outcome cannot be known with
certainty at point of individual decision, but
they emphasize that their analysis applies
to the plurality of collective decisions over
time. Thus, if logrolling is permitted, un-
certainty can be reduced if not eliminated.
The difficulties with this assumption are
several. In the first place, logrolling may
not occur. Moreover the fact that X and Y
decide to exchange votes on a series of
issues is not sufficient in itself to enable
prediction of collective outcome with any
appreciable degree of certainty. Some im-
provement may be admitted. The crucial
ingredient, however, is knowledge of the
exchanges taking place in the group rather
than the exchange itself.
The above remarks do not reach the
theoretical problems associated with deci-
sion-making under risky conditions. If
minimization of expected costs determines
which alternative an individual will choose,
then the individual must be able to predict
cost consequences of any choice he makes.
For example, if I buy a can of beans, the
consequences of my expenditure are ( 1 )
immediate and (2) predictable. If I spend
my money, I am assured of the beans. As-
sume, on the other hand, that I vote to
shift medical care from the private to the
public sector and that I know the decision-
making rules as well as the decisions that
will be made. There is still the problem of
estimating the cost, for the individual, of
any decision made. This estimate in the
B-T model, if I am rational, must control
my decision. Yet, in exchange for my vote,
I may or may not get the estimated benefit.
The possibility of intervening variables must
be considered. I may, for example, prefer
the private sector if my medical bills are
going to be negligible, the public sector
otherwise. An estimate of the consequential
cost of a shift must involve an estimate of
my future medical needs. It is obvious that
such an estimate may be in error. Yet in the
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B-T model, the &dquo;rationality&dquo; of a decision to
impose medical costs on the collectivity
would not be affected by estimate error. For
&dquo;rationality&dquo; is determined ultimately by the
individual’s own cost judgments.
Reduction of uncertainty through knowl-
edge of the probabilities attached to the
intervening event would not eliminate the
theoretical problems. Assume that I know
the cost of medical care purchased privately
will be $300 per year with probability 0.3
and $100 with probability 0.7, all depend-
ing on the state of my health. If the cost
of public medical care is $200 per year with
probability 1 (that is, state of health is not
a variable), then the question is whether I
prefer the chance of a $100 cost as against
a cost of $200 sufficiently to risk a cost of
$300. The B-T model furnishes little, if
any, guidance for this type of situation.
Indeed, the choice of the certainty assump-
tion for a decisional model may tend to
limit its use to trivial decision situations, for
in politics, it is uncertainty that makes the
game possible. Generally speaking, those
who have attempted to apply economic
models in political analysis have assumed too
hastily that the explicit and implicit assump-
tions of economic behavior can be carried
over to political behavior. The extent to
which this can be done with each and every
such assumption is a matter to be determined
by testable, empirical consequences, but the
literature of political science should furnish
some basis for initial judgment.
Having suggested some considerations
that might be relevant in evaluating the
realism of the B-T model, we may turn to
a different kind of inquiry, i.e., does the
theory lead to propositions of interest for
political activity? The answer here must
be strongly in the affirmative in view of
the authors’ telling theoretical arguments
for and against certain prevailing notions
in the literature of political science.
The authors’ discussion of &dquo;intensity&dquo;
among political preferences is particularly
suggestive. By permitting logrolling and
similar devices of exchange or side payment,
the B-T model mitigates the &dquo;equal inten-
sity&dquo; assumption of simple majority rule.
Moreover, it detracts from the view of some
theorists that the bicameral legislature is a
structure which enhances the ability of
intense minorities to thwart the will of the
majority. Buchanan and Tullock show,
theoretically, that with diverse bases of
representation the bicameral legislature not
only reduces external costs but that it
automatically distinguishes equal and un-
equal-intensity measures &dquo;imposing much
greater restraints on the erection of coali-
tions by members of intense minorities than
on majorities in equal intensity cases&dquo;
(p. 244). This may be of some interest to
those presently pondering the problems of
representation associated with the many
legislative reapportionment cases now in the
courts.
Similarly unexpected views are taken
with respect to qualified majorities. Given
any collective choice rule, Buchanan and
Tullock aver that decision-making costs will
be greater in communities characterized by
heterogeneous populations than in those in
which the population is homogeneous.
Suspicion and uncertainty about those
who differ in external characteristics will
promote bargaining difficulty. By implica-
tion, the heterogeneous community should
adopt more inclusive rules, i.e., require
more than a simple majority for decision.
Likewise, as the institutional structure is
varied from specific to general decision-
making, it is rational to support less in-
clusive rules. When combined, these propo-
sitions suggest that the greater the hetero-
geneity of the population, the greater the
activity that should be left to private choice.
This relationship is interesting because it
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runs counter to what can be observed
among the American states.
Finally, the authors argue that qualified
majority rule is not equivalent to minority
rule in situations in which neither the ma-
jority nor minority preference is adopted.
Thus, they see a basic distinction between
a positive decision authorizing action and
a negative decision blocking action. The
latter, they urge, does not constitute effec-
tive rule. Since in the B-T model an in-
crease in the required majority decreases
external cost, a rational man may well
prefer a qualified to a simple majority.
Given the restrictions within which the
discussion is conducted, the position taken
is clearly tenable. However, certain norma-
tive and objective considerations which
seem to exist in the real world are rejected or
inadequately treated, namely: (1) that in
decisional conflict the greater number
should prevail and (2) that inaction, in
fact, often has the effect of allocating
values. The authors’ own example can be
used to illustrate the latter point. If two-
thirds of a group is required to impose taxes
for road repair, then two-thirds of the mem-
bers can impose costs on the other one-third.
If one-third plus one can block additional
taxes, then, it is argued, in no way can such
a group impose additional costs on the other
two-thirds. But this clearly gives inade-
quate attention to the fact that real world
costs can be imposed on the two-thirds ma-
jority by external or third party events.
Such costs might be prevented by the ma-
jority unless blocked by the minority. In
the event of blockage, it would seem fatu-
ous to say that the minority has not imposed
a cost. Thus, where (2) prevails the dis-
tinction offered between the power to
impose a cost and the power to prevent an
imposition seems academic.
In sum, nothing said in this review is in-
tended to suggest that The Calculus of 
Consent is other than a closely reasoned and
major contribution to systematic political
theory. Its limitations are basically of the
type that afflict all oversimplified theories.
As the authors stress, however, this limita-
,tion is a challenge to broaden the theory
through the lessons to be learned with less
complex models. If in the final analysis a
theory is to be tested by its observable con-
sequences, the ultimate magnitude of the
authors’ contribution remains to be de-
termined.
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